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Impulsive control of portfolios
Jan Palczewski∗ Łukasz Stettner†
May 25, 2014
Abstract
In the paper a general model of a market with asset prices and economical factors of Marko-
vian structure is considered. The problem is to find optimal portfolio strategies maximizing a
discounted infinite horizon reward functional consisting of an integral term measuring quality of
the portfolio at each moment and a discrete term measuring the reward from consumption. There
are general transaction costs which, in particular, cover fixed plus proportional costs. It is shown,
under general conditions, that there exists an optimal impulse strategy and the value function is a
solution to the Bellman equation which corresponds to suitable quasi-variational inequalities.
Keywords: Markov process, impulsive control, Bellman equation, portfolio optimization, transaction
costs
1. Introduction
On a given probability space (Ω,F ,P) with filtration (Ft)t≥0 consider a market modeled by a time
homogeneous Markov process
(
S(t),X(t)
)
t≥0
, where S(t) =
(
S1(t), . . . ,Sd(t)
)
∈ (0,∞)d denotes
prices of d assets and X(t) ∈ Rm stands for m economic factors. The use of economic factors
was fully justified in [2]. Firstly, it expands capabilities of the model to some extent. Secondly, it
facilitates and improves the quality of statistical estimation of model parameters. We shall assume
that
(
S(t),X(t)
)
has right continuous and left limited trajectories and satisfies the so called Feller
property, i.e. its semigroup transforms the space of continuous bounded functions vanishing at infinity
into itself. We invest in assets. Let N i(t) be the number of shares of the i-th asset in our portfolio at
time t ≥ 0. The vector N(t) =
(
N1(t), . . . ,Nd(t)
)
describes the portfolio contents at time t. We
shall assume that N i(t) ∈ [0,∞), i = 1, . . . , d, which means that neither short-selling nor borrowing
is allowed. Let Ck ∈ [0,∞) be the amount of money withdrawn from the portfolio and consumed
at time τk, k = 1, 2, . . .. We are interested in maximization of the discounted infinite horizon reward
functional
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−αsF
(
Y (s)
)
ds+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατkG(Ck)
}
,
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where Y (s) =
(
N(s),S(s),X(s)
)
. We assume that changes of our portfolio strategy N(t) are of
impulsive form. An impulsive strategy Π =
(
(N0, 0), (N1,C1, τ1), (N2,C2, τ2), . . .
)
is a sequence
of non-decreasing stopping times τi, τ0 = 0, and Fτi-measurable random vectors Ni ∈ [0,∞)
d,
Ci ∈ [0,∞). At a random time τi the portfolio is changed from Ni−1 to Ni and the consumption of
Ci is executed. The choice of Ni and Ci should satisfy the self-financing property i.e.
Ni · S(τi) + Ci + c
(
Ni−1,Ni,S(τi)
)
= Ni−1 · S(τi), (1)
whereNi·S(τi)means the Euclidean scalar product of the vectorsNi and S(τi) and c
(
Ni−1,Ni,S(τi)
)
is a positive transaction cost given the assets’ price S(τi). In the paper we will omit a dot in the no-
tation for the scalar product of vectors unless it leads to ambiguity. We shall assume that the cost
function c : [0,∞)d × [0,∞)d × (0,∞)d → R is of the form c(η0, η1, s) = K + c˜(η0, η1, s), where
i) K > 0,
ii) c˜(η0, η1, s) is continuous,
iii) c˜(η0, η1 + γ, s)− c˜(η0, η1, s) ≤ β γ · s, for any γ ∈ [0,∞)
d and fixed β > 0,
iv) c˜(αη0,αη1, s) ≤ αc˜(η0, η1, s) for α ≥ 1,
v) c˜(η0, η1, s) ≥ 0,
vi) c˜(η0 + γ, η1 + γ, s) ≤ c˜(η0, η1, s) for γ ∈ [0,∞)
d.
The continuity of the cost function (ii) guarantees that a small change of the transaction does not
modify the cost significantly. The condition iii) sets an upper bound for the transaction costs: the cost
of acquiring γ shares cannot exceed a certain multiple of the price paid. We do not impose β < 1.
The cost (per share) of managing a portfolio goes down as a size of the portfolio increases on a real
market – this is grasped in iv) and vi). We do not assume that the cost function c is subadditive, i.e.
it may not satisfy the triangle inequality, thus it can be optimal to make multiple transactions at the
same moment.
The above requirements are not restrictive. They cover the case of fixed plus proportional transac-
tion costs, i.e.
c(n,n1, s) = K + (n− n1)
+αs+ (n− n1)
−α˜s, (2)
for diagonal matrices with non-negative entries α, α˜ ∈ Rd×d. Here, n+ means a positive part of every
coordinate and n− – a negative part of every coordinate. Moreover, the following cost functions fulfill
our requirements for the cost function:
c(n,n1, s) = K + c˜(n,n1, s),
c(n,n1, s) = max
(
K, c˜(n,n1, s)
)
,
where
c˜(n,n1, s) =
d∑
i=1
∫ (n−n1)+i
0
zi(t)dt+
d∑
i=1
∫ (n−n1)−i
0
zˆi(t)dt
and functions zi, zˆi are integrable and non-negative.
Given y = (η, s,x) ∈ E := [0,∞)d × (0,∞)d × Rm we shall denote by A(y) the class of
impulsive strategies for the process
(
S(t),X(t)
)
with the initial state S(0) = s, X(0) = x, given the
initial portfolio N(0) = η. Observe that the set A(y) of admissible strategies depends strongly on
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the initial point (η, s,x). Condition (1) defines the set of possible transactions. In the case of the cost
function (2), if the wealth of the portfolio is smaller than K no transaction can occur because there
are no funds to pay for it. However, ifNi−1 ·S(τi) ≥ K the set of possible transactions is non-empty.
The form of transaction costs fully justifies the use of impulsive strategies, since we cannot trade
continuously in the presence of a constant term in the cost function. One can see that there is a
remarkable difference between classical optimal impulsive control problems (see [1]) and the one
considered here. Namely, costs of the impulses do not appear as a penalizing term in the reward
functional; they are encoded in the set of available controls. This type of problems is widely discussed
in the literature. If we take F ≡ 0 andG – a utility function, we obtain a problem of optimal portfolio
selection with consumption (see [6], [8], [11]). The integral part of the reward functional appears in
various banking and cash management applications (see eg. third chapter of [14] or [4]). It measures in
particular divergence of the portfolio from a selected benchmark (see [3], [15]), proper diversification
(see [12]) or variance (see section 6c for more examples). Frequently function F depends on time,
which is achieved in our model by extending the set of economic factors with a deterministic variable
denoting time.
In the aforementioned papers authors consider models without economic factors and manage to
prove existence of optimal control in special cases. Economic factors are dealt with in [2]. A common
trait of the cited papers is the approach based on quasi-variational inequalities, introduced in [1]. In the
paper a different technique is used to combine transaction costs with a general model of stock prices
depending on economic factors. Existence of an optimal Markovian strategy under weak conditions
imposed on transaction costs mechanism and price processes is then proved. Examples of models that
satisfy above conditions are shown.
Acknowledgements. The authors thank an anonymous referee for valuable remarks and sugges-
tions. His work improved the paper in editorial as well as mathematical aspect.
2. Preliminary results
The following proposition is a very important result used throughout the paper. It shows a lower
bound for the multiplicity of a trading strategy in which the savings on transaction costs are invested,
for simplicity, in the asset 1. This result explains the meaning of the assumptions imposed on the cost
function.
PROPOSITION 2.1. Let Π =
(
(N0, τ0), (N1,C1, τ1), . . .
)
∈ A(N0, s,x) be an admissible strategy
and α > 1. There exists a strategy Π˜ =
(
(N˜0, τ0), (N˜1,C1, τ1), . . .
)
∈ A(αN0, s,x) with N˜0 =
αN0 such that
N˜1i = αN
1
i + γi,
N˜ki = αN
k
i , k = 2, . . . , d,
where
γi ≥ γi−1 +
α−1
β+1K
S1(τi)
,
and β is a constant from condition iii) in the definition of the cost function.
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Proof. We start with an initial portfolio N˜0 = αN0. We always keep at least αNi stocks after i-th
transaction. The structure of transaction costs ensures that we make savings bounded from below in
wealth at each transaction. These, invested in S1, cumulate. More precisely, γi denotes the cumulated
savings in the number of stocks of S1, γ0 = 0. We construct Π˜ in such a way that
N˜i − γiǫ1 = αNi, (3)
where ǫ1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R
d and γi is an Fτi-measurable random variable.
The construction of the strategy Π˜ is by induction. At the beginning N˜0 = αN0. Then N˜1 is
defined as a fixed point of
N˜0S(τ1) = N˜1S(τ1) + C1 + c
(
N˜0, N˜1,S(τ1)
)
.
satisfying (3). Apparently,
αN0S(τ1) = (αN1 + γ1ǫ1)S(τ1) + C1 +K + c˜
(
αN0,αN1 + γ1ǫ1,S(τ1)
)
= (#).
By definition
αN0S(τ1) = αN1S(τ1)+αC1+αc
(
N0,N1,S(τ1)
)
≥ αN1S(τ1)+C1+αK+c˜
(
αN0,αN1,S(τ1)
)
.
Therefore,
(#) ≤ (αN1 + γ1ǫ1)S(τ1) + C1 +K + c˜
(
αN0,αN1,S(τ1)
)
+ βγ1S
1(τ1)
≤ αN1S(τ1) + C1 + αK + c˜
(
αN0,αN1,S(τ1)
)
+ γ1S
1(τ1) + (1− α)K + βγ1S
1(τ1)
≤ αN0S(τ1) + γ1S
1(τ1) + (1− α)K + βγ1S
1(τ1)
= N˜0S(τ1) + (1− α)K + (β + 1)γ1S
1(τ1).
So we obtain a lower bound for γ1
(1− α)K + (β + 1)γ1S
1(τ1) ≥ 0,
or equivalently
γ1 ≥
α−1
β+1K
S1(τ1)
.
For the sake of clarity we present further steps of the induction. Let N˜i be defined as a fixed point
of
N˜i−1S(τi) = N˜iS(τi) + Ci + c
(
N˜i−1, N˜i,S(τi)
)
satisfying (3). Apparently,
(αNi−1+γi−1ǫ1)S(τi) = (αNi+γiǫ1)S(τi)+Ci+K+c˜
(
αNi−1+γi−1ǫ1,αNi+γiǫ1,S(τi)
)
= (##).
By definition
αNi−1S(τi) = αNiS(τi)+αCi+αc
(
Ni−1,Ni,S(τi)
)
≥ αNiS(τi)+Ci+αK+c˜
(
αNi−1,αNi,S(τi)
)
.
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Therefore,
(##) ≤ (αNi + γiǫ1)S(τi) + Ci +K + c˜
(
αNi−1 + γi−1ǫ1,αNi + γi−1ǫ1,S(τi)
)
+ β(γi − γi−1)S
1(τi)
≤ αNiS(τi) + Ci + αK + c˜
(
αNi−1,αNi,S(τi)
)
+ γiS
1(τi) + (1− α)K
+ β(γi − γi−1)S
1(τi)
≤ αNi−1S(τi) + γi−1S
1(τi) + (γi − γi−1)S
1(τi) + (1− α)K + β(γi − γi−1)S
1(τi)
= N˜i−1S(τi) + (1− α)K + (β + 1)(γi − γi−1)S
1(τi).
Consequently, we obtain a lower bound for γi
(1− α)K + (β + 1)(γi − γi−1)S
1(τi) ≥ 0,
or
γi − γi−1 ≥
α−1
β+1K
S1(τi)
.
Given an impulsive strategy Π ∈ A(y) we define the share holding process NΠ(t)
NΠ(t) =
∞∑
i=0
1[τi,τi+1)(t)Ni,
and the wealth processWΠ(t) = NΠ(t) · S(t). If two or more impulses occur at the same moment,
only the last one plays a role in the share holding process and the wealth process, since [a, a) = ∅.
Throughout the paper we shall require the following non-explosiveness assumption.
Assumption F. The wealth process for any admissible impulsive strategy is finite on any compact
interval [0,T ].
LEMMA 2.2. Under assumption F for any Π ∈ A(y), y = (η, s,x) ∈ E and L > 0 we have
P
(s,x)
(
lim
n→∞
τn ≤ L
)
= 0.
Proof. Fix an admissible strategy Π and L > 0. Assume that P(s,x)
(
limn→∞ τn ≤ L
)
> 0 and
denote this event by A. All our further reasoning will be held on the set A. The strategy funds an
infinite number of transactions. It means that it earns an infinite amount of money (although it may
be spent on transaction costs). We shall construct a strategy whose wealth is infinite in some point in
[0,L] thus contradicting the assumption F.
Let us fix α > 1. Let Π˜ be the strategy constructed in Proposition 2.1. The savings cumulated in
S1 are bounded by
γi − γi−1 ≥
α−1
β+1K
S1(τi)
.
Since S1 has ca´dla´g trajectories, which are bounded from above on [0,L] for each ω ∈ Ω, γi tends to
infinity. Hence, the wealth W˜ (t) of the portfolio Π˜ satisfies
W˜ (τ) ≥ lim
i→∞
γiS
1(τ),
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which contradicts the assumption F.
Notice that under assumption F each admissible strategy Π =
(
(N0, 0), (N1,C1, τ1), . . .
)
satisfies
lim
i→∞
τi =∞, a.s.
3. The optimization problem
For an admissible strategy Π for (η, s,x) ∈ E let us introduce the state process
Y (t) =

NΠ(t)S(t)
X(t)

 ∈ E.
To make the notation easier let us denote by Py the probability measure P(s,x), where y = (η, s,x) ∈
E.
Let F : E → R+ be a reward function that measures the quality of the portfolio at each moment
andG : [0,∞)→ R+ the reward function that measures the quality of consumption. We assume only
continuity of F and G, and the following
Assumption UF.
F (0, s,x) = inf
η∈[0,∞)d
F (η, s,x), (s,x) ∈ (0,∞)d × Rm.
Our goal is to maximize the reward functional
J(Π) = E (s,x)
{∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
dt+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G
(
CΠk
)}
(4)
over the set of admissible strategies Π for (η, s,x) ∈ E. Let us introduce a value function
v(y) = sup{J(Π) : Π ∈ A(y)}, y ∈ E. (5)
To formulate a Bellman equation we need to introduce a switching operator
Mu(η, s,x) = sup
{
G(ς) + u(η1, s,x) : (η1, ς) ∈ Γ(η, s)
}
∨ u(0, s,x),
where
Γ(η, s) =
{
(η1, ς) ∈ [0,∞)
d × [0,∞) : η1 · s+ ς + c(η, η1, s) = η · s
}
and sup ∅ = −∞.
DEFINITION 3.1. Ameasurable function I = (I1, I2) : E → [0,∞)
d× [0,∞) is called an impulse
function forMu if
Mu(η, s,x) = G
(
I2(η, s,x)
)
+ u
(
I1(η, s,x), s,x
)
and I(η, s,x) ∈ Γ(η, s).
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Now we can define the Bellman operator
Gu(y) = sup
τ
E
y
(∫ τ
0
e−αtF
(
Y (t)
)
dt+ e−ατMu
(
Y (τ)
))
for any measurable function u : E → R such thatMu is well-defined.
Let us denote by CB(K;L) the set of bounded continuous functions acting from K into L, by
CL(K;L) the set of lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) functions, and by CU (K;L) is the set of upper
semi-continuous (u.s.c.) functions.
LEMMA 3.2. M transforms C(E,R) and CU (E;R) into itself and if G is bounded CB(E,R) into
itself. Moreover, for any continuous, non-negative function u there exists an impulse function for
Mu.
Proof. Denote by Γ˜(η, s,x) the set of possible impulses:
Γ˜(η, s,x) =
{
((η1, s,x), ς1) ∈ E × [0,∞) : (η1, ς1) ∈ Γ(η, s)
}
∪ {((0, s,x), 0)}.
Each set Γ˜(η, s,x) is compact, since c is a continuous function. Take u ∈ CU (E;R) and a sequence
yn → y in E. Denote by (zn, ςn) ∈ Γ˜(yn) maximizers for yn i.e. Mu(yn) = G(ςn) + u(zn). Since⋃
n∈N Γ˜(yn) is bounded, its closure is compact and we can find a subsequence of (zn, ςn) converging
to some (z, ς) in E× [0,∞). For simplicity such a subsequence we shall denote again by (zn, ςn). By
u.s.c. of u we have lim supn→∞ u(zn) ≤ u(z). By continuity of G we have limn→∞G(ςn) = G(ς).
Moreover, (z, ς) ∈ Γ˜(y) by continuity of c. Hence G(ς) + u(z) ≤Mu(y) andMu is u.s.c.
Now we shall prove thatMu is l.s.c. for a continuous function u. As above let us take a sequence
yn → y in E and fix ǫ > 0. Denote by (z, ς) the maximizer of Mu(y) i.e. Mu(y) = G(ς) + u(z).
By continuity of u and G there exists δ > 0 such that
z˜ ∈ B1 =⇒ |u(z˜)− u(z)| ≤ ǫ,
ς˜ ∈ B2 =⇒ |G(ς˜)−G(ς)| ≤ ǫ,
where B1 = {z˜ ∈ E : ‖z − z˜‖ ≤ δ} and B2 = {ς˜ ∈ [0,∞) : ‖ς − ς˜‖ ≤ δ}. Moreover,
B1×B2∩ Γ˜(yn) 6= ∅ for sufficiently large n. Hence lim infn→∞Mu(yn) ≥ u(z)+G(ς)−2ǫ. Since
ǫ can be taken arbitrarily small, lim infn→∞Mu(yn) ≥ u(z) +G(ς) andMu is l.s.c. Consequently,
Mu is continuous for a continuous u. Its boundedness is obvious.
The existence of an impulse function forMv is a direct consequence of Proposition D.3 in [7].
Let us denote
v0(y) = E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y (t)
)
dt, y ∈ E,
and vi+1 = Gvi, i = 0, 1, . . .. Recall that v is a value function.
LEMMA 3.3. If F ,G ∈ CB(E,R+) and v(y) < ∞ for all y ∈ E then vi are continuous and
converge to v in a monotone way. Moreover, vi is a value function for the problem with the
number of transactions bounded by i.
Proof. Continuity of vi is obtained by induction. It results from the Feller property of
(
S(t),X(t)
)
,
continuity of the value function corresponding to a stopping problem with a bounded functional as
in the above Bellman operator (for continuity and boundedness of Mvi see Lemma 3.2, for further
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details see [10]). Consequently, standard impulsive control arguments show that vi is a value function
for the problem with the number of transactions bounded by i.
Although it is evident that vi is a non-decreasing sequence, the fact that vi(y) converges to v(y) for
every y ∈ Y requires justification. Fix y ∈ E and denote by u(y) the limit limi→∞ vi(y). Certainly,
u(y) ≤ v(y). Fix a strategy Π ∈ A(y) and denote by Πi its restriction to first i transactions. We
easily have that vi(y) ≥ J(Π
i) and u(y) ≥ J(Πi). Observe that
gi =
∫ τi
0
e−αsF
(
Y Π(s)
)
ds+
i∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk )
is a monotone sequence of non-negative random variables with the limit g =
∫∞
0 e
−αsF
(
Y Π(s)
)
ds+∑∞
k=1 e
−ατΠ
k G(CΠk ). By the monotone convergence theorem E
ygi → E
yg = J(Π). Moreover,
J(Πi) ≥ E ygi, so lim infi→∞ J(Π
i) ≥ J(Π). Hence, u(y) ≥ J(Π), because vi(y) ≥ J(Π
i). Since
this is true for any Π ∈ A(y), u(y) ≥ v(y).
Now we can explain the meaning of the switching operator and assumption UF. For u = vi or
u = v we have
Mu(η, s,x) =
{
sup
{
G(ς) + u(η1, s,x) : (η1, ς) ∈ Γ(η, s)
}
, Γ(η, s) 6= ∅,
u(0, s,x), Γ(η, s) = ∅.
Therefore, an impulse to 0 is a synonym of going bankrupt when one wants to perform a transaction
without having enough money to cover transaction costs. Assumption UF assures that it cannot be
economical. It is not possible to get a worse score than that related to the zero portfolio.
4. The optimal strategy for bounded F and G
We shall concentrate first on the case of bounded reward function F without consumption, i.e. G ≡ 0.
We recall that F is assumed to be continuous and non-negative.
Assumption NFL. For every y ∈ E there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for every T > 0
H(B,T ) = sup
z∈B
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
zNΠ(T )S(T ) <∞,
where NΠ is a share holding process linked to Π and B = B
(
y, ǫ
)
⊆ E is an open ball.
Assumption NUM. S1 is a non-decreasing process.
Assumption NFL plays the role of a no-arbitrage condition. It also implies that the market satisfies
condition F. Assumption NUM states that the first asset represents a generalized bank account (positive
jumps are allowed). These assumptions are required to obtain an estimate for the growth of the
transactions’ moments.
LEMMA 4.1. If assumptions NFL and NUM are satisfied then for any y ∈ E there exists δ > 0 such
that
sup
z∈B(y,δ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
ye−ατ
Π
i → 0, as i→∞,
where B(y, δ) is an open ball in E.
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Proof. Fix T > 0 and consider an estimate
E
ze−ατ
Π
i ≤ Pz(τΠi ≤ T ) + e
−αT
P
z(τΠi > T ) ≤ P
z(τΠi ≤ T ) + e
−αT . (6)
From NFL there exists a ball B = B(2y, ǫ) such that H(B,T ) < ∞. Put δ = ǫ2 and take z =
(η, s,x) ∈ B(y, δ) and a strategy Π ∈ A(z). By Proposition 2.1 there exists a doubled strategy
Π˜ ∈ A(2η, s,x) (i.e. with α = 2) with the following bound for the savings deposited in S1:
γi − γi−1 ≥
1
β+1K
S1(τi)
.
S1 is non-decreasing, so γiS
1(τi) ≥ i
1
β+1K. Hence,
P
z(τΠi ≤ T ) = P
z(τ Π˜i ≤ T ) ≤ P
z
(
N Π˜(T )S(T ) > i
1
β + 1
K
)
≤
E
zN Π˜(T )S(T )
i 1β+1K
≤
H(B,T )
i 1β+1K
by Tchebyshev inequality. Consequently
E
ze−ατ
Π
i ≤
H(B,T )
i 1β+1K
+ e−αT .
Therefore, E ze−ατ
Π
i tends to zero uniformly for z ∈ B(y, δ), Π ∈ A(z).
THEOREM 4.2. Assume NFL, NUM and G ≡ 0. The value function v is continuous and satisfies
the Bellman equation
v = Gv.
Proof. First observe that v is a bounded function from boundedness of F . Let
v0(y) = E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αsF
(
Y (s)
)
ds
and vi(y) = Gvi−1(y), i = 1, 2, . . .. By Lemma 3.3 vi increases to v and vi, i = 0, 1, . . ., are con-
tinuous functions. We shall show that the convergence is almost uniform (i.e. uniform on compacts),
which implies that the value function is continuous. Fix y ∈ E. Let us write Πi for the restriction of
the strategy Π to the first i impulses. PutAi(y) = {Πi : Π ∈ A(y)}. We get the following estimate:
0 ≤ v(y)− vi(y) = sup
Π∈A(y)
J(Π)− sup
Π˜∈Ai(y)
J(Π˜) ≤ sup
Π∈A(y)
∣∣J(Π)− J(Πi)∣∣
≤ sup
Π∈A(y)
‖F‖∞
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i (7)
By Lemma 4.1 E ye−ατ
Π
i tends to zero uniformly on a ball B(y, δ) for some δ > 0. Therefore, the
convergence of vi to v on this ball is uniform. Consequently, v is a continuous function.
The proof that v = Gv is straightforward.
The first part of this section is devoted to the case with G ≡ 0, i.e. without consumption. Here
we move to the general case. This, however, requires an additional assumption NFL1, introduced
below. Although consumption can be easily incorporated into the above theorem, we shall present a
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different proof of existence of an optimal strategy based on a classical result concerning solution of
the Bellman equation. Let us introduce the following notation:
Hǫ(B,T ) = sup
z∈B
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
(
NΠ(T ) · S
(
T )
)1+ǫ
, ǫ > 0
for a compact set B ⊆ E and T > 0.
Assumption NFL1. For every y ∈ E there exists constants δ, θ,κ, ǫ with κ < α such that
Hǫ(B, t) ≤ θe
κt,
where B = B(y, δ).
LEMMA 4.3. If NUM and NFL1 are satisfied then for every y ∈ E there exists δ > 0 such that
∞∑
i=1
sup
z∈B(y,δ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
Πe−ατ
Π
i <∞
and consequently
sup
z∈B(y,δ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
∞∑
i=1
E
Πe−ατ
Π
i <∞.
Proof. Fix y ∈ E. By assumption NFL1 there existB = B(2y, 2δ) and positive constants θ,κ, ǫ, with
κ < α, such that
Hǫ(B, t) ≤ θe
κt, t ≥ 0. (8)
Take z = (η, s,x) ∈ B(y, δ) and a strategy Π ∈ A(z). By Proposition 2.1 there exists a doubled
strategy Π˜ ∈ A(2η, s,x) (i.e. with α = 2) with the following bound for savings invested in S1
γi − γi−1 ≥
1
β+1K
S1(τi)
.
S1 is non-decreasing, so γiS
1(τi) ≥ i
1
β+1K. By Tchebyshev inequality, for any t ≥ 0,
P
y(τΠi ≤ t) = P
y(τ Π˜i ≤ t) ≤ P
y
(
N Π˜(t) · S(t) > i
1
β + 1
K
)
≤
E
y
(
N Π˜(t) · S(t)
)1+ǫ(
i 1β+1K
)1+ǫ ≤ Hǫ(B, t)(
i 1β+1K
)1+ǫ ,
and the bound does not depend on the choice of Π ∈ A(z), z ∈ B(y, δ). Integration by parts yields
the following estimate
E
ye−ατ
Π
i = α
∫ ∞
0
e−αt P(τΠi ≤ t)dt ≤ α
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
Hǫ(B, t)(
i 1β+1K
)1+ǫ dt = Dαi1+ǫ 1α− κ
with
D =
θ(
1
β+1K
)1+ǫ .
Hence
∞∑
i=1
sup
z∈B(y,δ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
ye−ατ
Π
i ≤
Dα
α− κ
∞∑
i=1
1
i1+ǫ
<∞. (9)
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THEOREM 4.4. Assume that NUM and NFL1 are satisfied. The value function v(y) is continuous
and satisfies the Bellman equation v = Gv.
Proof. Let
v0(y) = E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αsF
(
Y (s)
)
ds
and vi(y) = Gvi−1(y), i = 1, 2, . . .. By Lemma 3.3 vi increases to v and vi, i = 0, 1, . . ., are
continuous functions. We shall show that the convergence is uniform on compacts, which implies that
the value function is continuous. Fix y ∈ E. Let us write Πi for the restriction of the strategy Π to the
first i impulses. Put Ai(y) = {Πi : Π ∈ A(y)}. We obtain the following estimate:
0 ≤ v(y)− vi(y) = sup
Π∈A(y)
J(Π)− sup
Π˜∈Ai(y)
J(Π˜) ≤ sup
Π∈A(y)
∣∣J(Π)− J(Πi)∣∣
≤ sup
Π∈A(y)
{‖F‖∞
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i + ‖G‖∞
∞∑
k=i
E
ye−ατ
Π
k
}
. (10)
Hence vi(y) converges to v(y) uniformly on compact subsets of E by Lemma 4.1 and 4.3. Conse-
quently, v is a continuous function. By the monotonicity of the sequence vi and Monotone Conver-
gence Theorem we obtain v = Gv.
COROLLARY 4.5. Under assumptions of the above theorems there exists an optimal Markovian
strategy maximizing the reward functional. It is characterised by an impulse region I given by
I = {y ∈ E : v(y) =Mv(y)},
where v is a value function. In detail, for a starting point y = (η, s,x)
τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0 :
(
η,S(t),X(t)
)
∈ I},
τi = inf{t > τi−1 :
(
Ni−1,S(t),X(t)
)
∈ I},
Ni = I1
(
Ni−1,S(τi),X(τi)
)
,
Ci = I2
(
Ni−1,S(τi),X(τi)
)
,
where I : E → E × [0,∞) is the impulse function forMv.
Proof. The proof is an easy consequence of Lemma 3.2 and 3.3.
Corollary 4.5 states that we are able to find an optimal strategy. Moreover, this strategy is Marko-
vian, i.e. it depends only on the present state of the world. It is also stationary: there are equivalent
requirements for each transaction to take place. Observe that for G ≡ 0 (Theorem 4.2) the second
coordinate of the impulse function I2 is equal to zero and no wealth is consumed in the optimal
strategy.
5. Unbounded reward functional
In the previous section we assumed F andG to be bounded. Nowwe remove this restriction; functions
F and G are unbounded, non-negative and continuous. However, we will need a new assumption
which takes into account functions F ,G. Recall that neither NFL nor NFL1 depend on F ,G.
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Assumption NFL2. For every y ∈ E there exist κ > 1, ǫ > 0 such that
sup
z∈B
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
{∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
F
(
Y Π(t)
))κ
dt+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)κ}
<∞,
where B = B
(
y, ǫ
)
⊆ E is an open ball.
THEOREM 5.1. If NUM, NFL1 and NFL2 are satisfied then the value function v is continuous and
satisfies Bellman equation v = Gv. Moreover, there exists an optimal strategy.
REMARK 5.2. If G ≡ 0, i.e. there is no consumption, assumption NFL1 can be replaced with NFL.
Observe also that NFL1 implies NFL.
Proof of theorem 5.1. Assumptions NFL1 and NFL2 guarantee that v(y) <∞ for all y ∈ E. Let
v0(y) = E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αsF
(
Y (s)
)
ds
and vi(y) = Gvi−1(y), i = 1, 2, . . .. In the contrary to the proof of Theorem 4.4 we cannot use
Lemma 3.3 to prove continuity of vi because of unboundedness of F and G. Instead, for Π ∈ A(y),
y ∈ E, we define a family of functionals
JH(Π) = E (s,x)
{∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
F
(
Y Π(t)
)
∧H
)
dt+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G
(
CΠk
)
∧H
)}
, H > 0.
Denote by vH and vHi , i = 0, 1, . . ., appropriate value functions. By Theorem 4.4 they are continuous.
We shall show that they converge uniformly on compact sets to v and vi respectively as H tends to
∞.
Fix y ∈ E. By assumption NFL2 there exist constants ǫ > 0 and κ > 1 such that
sup
z∈B(y,ǫ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
F
(
Y Π(t)
))κ
dt < D <∞,
sup
z∈B(y,ǫ)
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)κ
< D <∞.
(11)
For z ∈ B(y, ǫ), H > 0 define
RH(z) = sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
{∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
1F (Y Π(t))≥Hdt+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G
(
CΠk
)
1G(CΠ
k
)≥H
}
(12)
and observe that
vi(z)− v
H
i (z) ≤ R
H(z),
v(z)− vH(z) ≤ RH(z).
For the first term of (12) we obtain
E
z
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
1F (Y Π(t))≥Hdt
≤ E z
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)(F (Y Π(t)))κ−1
Hκ−1
1F (Y Π(t))≥Hdt
≤
1
Hκ−1
E
z
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
F
(
Y Π(t)
))κ
dt.
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Similar argument applied to the second term of (12) yields
E
z
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G
(
CΠk
)
1G(CΠ
k
)≥H ≤
1
Hκ−1
E
z
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G
(
CΠk
))κ
.
Hence, by (11)
RH(z) ≤
2D
Hκ−1
, z ∈ B(y, ǫ).
Consequently, vi and v are continuous and vi converges to v pointwise as i → ∞. Moreover, vi is a
value function for the problem with the number of transactions bounded by i. We show that v = Gv
in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. The optimality of the strategy Π constructed in
Corollary 4.5 results from pointwise convergence of vi to v.
6. Examples
In Subsection 6a we provide sufficient conditions for NFL, NFL1 and NFL2 to be satisfied in a general
Markovian multiplicative model. Subsection 6b elaborates on a specific case of the multiplicative
model, namely exponential diffusion with bounded coefficients depending on Markovian economic
factors. We are able to provide stronger results than those coming from Subsection 6a. Important
examples of reward functions satisfying assumptions UF and AF are given in Subsection 6c.
6a. Multiplicative price process
The market is modeled by the d-dimensional price process S(t) given as
Si(t) = eZ
i(t), i = 1, . . . , d.
Let X(t) be the process of economic factors. Assume that
(
Z(t),X(t)
)
and
(
S(t),X(t)
)
satisfy the
Feller property.
The aim of this subsection is to formulate sufficient conditions in terms of the underlying price
process for NFL, NFL1 and NFL2 to hold true.
Assumption MLT. There exist β > 0
E
z˜
{(
Si(t)
)2∣∣Fu} ≤ (Si(u))2e2β(t−u), 0 ≤ u ≤ t, i = 1, . . . , d, z˜ ∈ E.
The diffusion price process given by equation (21) in the next subsection satisfies the MLT with β
equal to that of Lemma 6.14.
THEOREM 6.1. If the price process satisfies MLT, there exist β > 0 such that
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ (η0 · s0)
2e2βT , y = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E, T ≥ 0.
COROLLARY 6.2. If the price process satisfies MLT, there exist β > 0 such that
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)δ
≤ (η0 · s0)
δeδβT , y = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E, T ≥ 0, δ ∈ [1, 2].
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Proof. It is an easy application of Ho¨lder inequality.
We shall postpone the proof of Theorem 6.1 in order to concentrate first on its consequences.
Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.2 enable us to find sufficient conditions for assumptions NFL, NFL1
and NFL2 to be satisfied. Assume MLT with a constant β. Easily, for T > 0, z = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E,
Π ∈ A(z)
E
zNΠ(T ) · S(T ) ≤ (η0 · s0)e
βT (13)
so assumption NFL is satisfied. Assumption NFL1 is satisfied for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1] with κ = (1 + ǫ)β,
since by Corollary 6.2 for z = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E
sup
Π∈A(z)
E
z
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)1+ǫ
≤ (η0 · s0)
1+ǫe(1+ǫ)βt. (14)
Only the case of unbounded reward functional requires more consideration. Assume that α > β,
G is bounded and F satisfies
Assumption AF. There exist constants A,B such that
0 ≤ F (η, s,x) ≤ A+B(η · s), (η, s,x) ∈ E.
We shall show that NFL2 is satisfied with κ ∈ (1, αβ ∧ 2].
LEMMA 6.3. There exist constants C1,C2 ≥ 0 depending on κ ∈ [1,
α
β ∧ 2] such that for y =
(η0, s0,x0) ∈ E,
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
z
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)κ
dt ≤ C1 + C2(η0 · s0)
κ.
Proof. By Corollary 6.2 and the fact that a ≤ 1 + a2 for a ≥ 0, for γ > 2β
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−γtF
(
Y Π(t)
)2
dt
≤ sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−γt
(
A2 + 2ABNΠ(t) · S(t) +B2
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)2)
dt
=
A2
γ
+ 2AB E y
∫ ∞
0
e−γtNΠ(t) · S(t)dt+B2 E y
∫ ∞
0
e−γt
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)2
dt
≤
A2
γ
+ 2AB
(1
γ
+ (η0 · s0)
2
∫ ∞
0
e−γt+2βtdt
)
+B2(η0 · s0)
2
∫ ∞
0
e−γt+2βtdt
= C˜1 + C˜2(η0 · s0)
2.
Take γ = 2ακ . By Ho¨lder inequality we obtain
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)κ
dt ≤
(
C˜1 + C˜2(η0 · s0)
2
)κ/2
.
We conclude by the application of the inequality (a+ b)δ ≤ aδ + bδ for δ ∈ (0, 1], a, b ≥ 0.
We shall prove NFL2 for any κ ∈ (1, αβ ∧ 2]. By Lemma 6.3 the first term of NFL2
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)κ
dt
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is bounded uniformly for y in compact subsets of E. The second term is also uniformly bounded on
compact sets by Lemma 4.3, since for y ∈ E
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
z
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)κ
≤
(
sup
ς∈[0,∞)
G(ς)
)κ
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
z
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k .
Now, let us concentrate on the proof of Theorem 6.1. Notice that it is sufficient to prove the
estimate on the wealth in the case of no transaction costs but with the same form of strategies. A
class of strategies we deal with here is described in the following definition. It differs from the class
we worked with only in two points. We removed consumption and the requirement of financing
transaction costs. We may think of transaction costs being funded from external sources.
DEFINITION 6.4. Π =
(
(N0, τ0), (N1, τ1), . . .
)
is an admissible strategy without transaction
costs if
i) 0 = τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 · · · are stopping times,
ii) Ni is Fτi measurable,
iii) Ni ∈ E
N a.s.,
iv) NiS(τi) = Ni−1S(τi) a.s. (self-financing),
v) P(limn→∞ τn =∞) = 1.
The set of admissible strategies for a starting point y = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E is denoted by A˜(y). An
admissible strategy Π belongs to A˜(y) if N0 = η0 and the self-financing condition holds for the price
process starting from (s0,x0). Now we can formulate the result.
PROPOSITION 6.5. If the price process satisfies MLT with the constant β then for each T ≥ 0
sup
Π∈A˜(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ (η0 · s0)
2e2βT , y = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E. (15)
The proof of Proposition 6.5 is based on the time discretization and continuity of the semigroup
corresponding to the Feller processes. First we prove (15) for strategies with transactions occurring
only in a finite number of deterministic times. As the set of this moments gets more dense in [0,T ] its
approximation of the left-hand side of (15) improves. Finally, in the limit we obtain (15).
Proof of Proposition 6.5. We will skip the superscriptΠ inNΠ and τΠi if it does not cause ambiguity.
For n ∈ N we define a dyadic split of the interval [0,T ]
Dn =
{
0,
T
2n
,
2T
2n
, . . . ,T
}
.
In the set of admissible strategies without transaction costs A˜(y) we choose those with transactions
held almost surely in the set Dn and denote them by A˜n(y). We can view a strategy in A˜n(y) as
having transactions at each point of Dn. It is justified by the absence of transaction costs, since any
change in the portfolio contents can take place only in the points ofDn. By A˜
m(y) we understand all
trading strategies that have at most m transactions on [0,T ]. Similarly, A˜mn (y) denotes the strategies
from A˜m(y) that belong to A˜n(y). More formally
A˜n(y) =
{
Π ∈ A˜(y) : Py(τi ∩ [0,T ] ∈ Dn ∀i) = 1
}
, y ∈ E, n ∈ N,
A˜m(y) =
{
Π ∈ A˜(y) : τm+1 > T P
y-a.s.
}
, y ∈ E, m ∈ N,
A˜mn (y) = A˜
m(y) ∩ A˜n(y), y ∈ E, m ∈ N.
The following lemma assures integrability of the left-hand side of (15) for strategies from A˜m.
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LEMMA 6.6.
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
<∞, Π ∈ A˜m(y), m ∈ N, y ∈ E.
Proof. We shall obtain the estimate
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ (η0 · s0)
2e2mβT , (16)
where y = (η0, s0,x0) and β is the constant from assumption MLT.
First notice that
(
NΠ(T ) ·S(T )
)2
is a non-negative random variable, so its conditional expectation
is well-defined, though it can be infinite in some points. Fix m ∈ N. The lack of transaction costs
allows us to assume that τm ≤ T . It may be done formally in the following way:
τ ′1 = τ1 ∧ T , . . . , τ
′
m = τm ∧ T ,
τ ′m+1 = τ1 ∨ T , . . . τ
′
2m = τm ∨ T ,
τ ′2m+k = τm+k, k > 0.
Obviously, the portfolio contents process linked to the new trading strategy is identical to NΠ(t).
Therefore, with the above transformation in mind we obtain
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
= E y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
NΠ(T )iSi(T )N j(T )Sj(T )
}
= E y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
E
y
{
N i(T )Si(T )N j(T )Sj(T )
∣∣Fτm}}.
We estimate separately each element of the sum using Schwarz inequality.
E
y
{
N i(T )Si(T )N j(T )Sj(T )
∣∣Fτm} = E y{N i(τm)Si(T )N j(τm)Sj(T )∣∣Fτm}
= N i(τm)N
j(τm)E
y
{
Si(T )Sj(T )
∣∣Fτm}
≤ N i(τm)N
j(τm)
(
E
y
{(
Si(T )
)2∣∣Fτm}) 12(
E
y
{(
Sj(T )
)2∣∣Fτm}) 12 .
Assumption MLT allows us to make the following bound
N i(τm)N
j(τm)S
i(τm)
(
E
y
{
e2β(T−τm)
∣∣Fτm}) 12Sj(τm)(E y{e2β(T−τm)∣∣Fτm}) 12
≤ N i(τm)N
j(τm)S
i(τm)S
j(τm)e
2βT .
Finally
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ E y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
N i(τm)N
j(τm)S
i(τm)S
j(τm)e
2βT
}
= E y
(
N(τm) · S(τm)
)2
e2βT .
The condition of self-financing of the strategy yields
E
y
(
N(τm) · S(τm)
)2
e2βT ≤ E y
(
N(τm−) · S(τm)
)2
e2βT .
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Repeating this reasoning leads to (16).
In the following lemma we use the fact that the strategies from A˜n(y) can be perceived as having
transactions in each moment of the dyadic splitDn. Let us denote by β the constant from the estimate
in assumption MLT.
LEMMA 6.7. For each n ∈ N
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ (η0 · s0)
2e2βT , Π ∈ A˜n(y), y = (η0, s0,x0) ∈ E.
Proof. Fix y ∈ E and a strategy Π ∈ An(y). For use in this proof we denote all points of Dn
by t0, t1, . . . , t2n , i.e. ti = T i/2
n. Furthermore, we use the notation N2n = N
Π(t2n), N2n−1 =
NΠ(t2n−1), . . . . Clearly, Nti is Fti measurable for i = 1, . . . 2
n.
By self-financing condition we have that N2n · S(T ) = N2n−1 · S(T ) and therefore
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
= E y
(
N2n · S(T )
)2
= E y
(
N2n−1 · S(T )
)2
= E y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
N i2n−1S
i(T )N j2n−1S
j(T )
}
= E y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
E
y
{
N i2n−1S
i(T )N j2n−1S
j(T )
∣∣Ft2n−1}}.
(17)
We estimate separately each element of the sum using Schwarz inequality.
E
y
{
N i2n−1S
i(T )N j2n−1S
j(T )
∣∣Ft2n−1} = N i2n−1N j2n−1E y{Si(T )Sj(T )∣∣Ft2n−1}
≤ N i2n−1N
j
2n−1
(
E
y
{(
Si(T )
)2∣∣Ft2n−1}) 12(
E
y
{(
Sj(T )
)2∣∣Ft2n−1}) 12 .
(18)
Assumption MLT allows us to make the following bound for (18)
N i2n−1N
j
2n−1S
i(t2n−1)e
β
2n Sj(t2n−1)e
β
2n .
Finally (17) is bounded by
E
y
{ d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
N i2n−1S
i(t2n−1)N
j
2n−1S
j(t2n−1)e
2β
2n
}
= E y
(
N2n−1 · S(t2n−1)
)2
e
2β
2n .
Repeating the reasoning presented above (2n − 1) times we obtain the result of the lemma.
We shall strongly exploit the continuity of the semigroup connected to the process
(
Z(t),X(t)
)
.
For the sake of simplicity of formulation of the following two lemmas let us denote Y˜ (t) =
(
Z(t),X(t)
)
∈
R
d × Rm. The statements of the lemmas, together with the references for proof, come from [13].
LEMMA 6.8. For any compact setK ⊆ Rd×Rm, ǫ > 0, T > 0, there exists a compact setK1 ⊇ K
such that
sup
y∈[0,∞)d×K
P
y
{
Y˜ (t) /∈ K1 for some t ∈ [0,T ]
}
< ǫ.
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LEMMA 6.9. Let Oδ(y˜) = {z˜ ∈ R
d × Rm : ‖y˜ − z˜‖ < δ}, y ∈ Rd × Rm.
∀ǫ>0, δ>0∀K1 – compact∃h0∀h≤h0∀y˜∈K1 P
(η0,y˜)
{
Y˜ (h) /∈ Oδ(y˜)
}
< ǫ, η0 ∈ [0,∞)
d.
Lemma 6.8 is proved in [9], Lemma 2. Lemma 6.9 can be proved almost identically to Lemma 2.5 in
[5]. As a corollary to Lemma 6.9 one can obtain
COROLLARY 6.10. Let τ be a bounded stopping time. For every δ, ǫ > 0, a compact set B˜ ⊆
R
d × Rm there exists η > 0 and a compact set B˜1 ⊇ B˜ such that
P
y
{
‖Y˜ (τ)− Y˜ (σ)‖ ≥ δ, Y˜ (τ) ∈ B˜1
}
≤ ǫ, y ∈ [0,∞)d ×B.
for any Fτ -measurable random variable σ satisfying
0 ≤ σ − τ ≤ η.
Now, we will use the continuity results from Corollary 6.10 and Lemma 6.7 to obtain a bound for
the wealth of portfolios from A˜m(y).
LEMMA 6.11. Form ∈ N, y ∈ E, Π ∈ A˜m(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ lim
n→∞
sup
Π′∈A˜mn (y)
E
y
(
NΠ
′
(T ) · S(T )
)2
.
Proof. We shall use the following discretization scheme of a trading strategy. Let Π ∈ A˜m(y),
Π =
(
(N0, τ0), (N1, τ1), . . . , (Nm, τm)
)
.
As before, we assume that τm ≤ T . We construct an n-discretization of Π, denoted by Πn, in order
to obtain an element of A˜mn (y). Consider the following approximation of the transaction moments:
τn,l =
kT
2n
if
(k − 1)T
2n
< τl ≤
kT
2n
, k = 0, 1, . . . , 2n, l = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
Clearly, 0 ≤ τn,l − τn ≤ 2
−n. We assume that the number of assets held is proportional to that of the
strategy Π, i.e.
Nn,l = αn,lNl, l = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
Certainly, αn,0 = 1. Moreover, the self-financing condition must be satisfied
αn,l−1Nl−1 · S(τn,l) = αn,lNl · S(τn,l).
The above relationship fully defines αn,l as an Fτn,l-measurable random variable.
Now, for arbitrary δ, ǫ > 0 we will find N(δ, ǫ) such that for n ≥ N(δ, ǫ) there exists a set
An(δ, ǫ) ⊆ Ω with P
y{An(δ, ǫ)} ≥ 1− ǫ and
An(δ, ǫ) ⊆
{Si(τn,l)
Si(τl)
∈ [e−δ, eδ], i = 1, . . . , d, l = 0, . . . ,m
}
. (19)
By Lemma 6.8 there exists a compact set B˜1 ⊆ R
d × Rm such that y ∈ B˜1 and
P
y
{(
Z(t),X(t)
)
/∈ B˜1 for t ∈ [0,T ]
}
<
ǫ
m+ 1
.
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From Corollary 6.10 we can find anN ∈ N such that for n ≥ N the n-discretization Πn of Π satisfies
P
y
{
|Z(τn,l)− Z(τl)| > δ,
(
Z(τl),X(τl)
)
∈ B˜1
}
≤
ǫ
m+ 1
, l = 1, . . . ,m.
Therefore,
P
y{Acn(δ, ǫ)} = P
y
{
∃l∈{1,2,...,m}|Z(τn,l)− Z(τl)| > δ
}
= Py
{
∃l∈{1,2,...,m}|Z(τn,l)− Z(τl)| > δ, ∃t∈[0,T ]
(
Z(τl),X(τl)
)
/∈ B˜1
}
+ Py
{
∃l∈{1,2,...,m}|Z(τn,l)− Z(τl)| > δ, ∀t∈[0,T ]
(
Z(τl),X(τl)
)
∈ B˜1
}
≤ Py
{
∃t∈[0,T ]
(
Z(τl),X(τl)
)
/∈ B˜1
}
+
m∑
l=1
P
y
{
|Z(τn,l)− Z(τl)| > δ, ∀t∈[0,T ]
(
Z(τl),X(τl)
)
∈ B˜1
}
≤
ǫ
m+ 1
+m
ǫ
m+ 1
= ǫ.
Fix δ, ǫ > 0 and take n ≥ N(δ, ǫ). We will provide an estimate of αm from below on the set
An(δ, ǫ). Fix a transaction number l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The wealth before the transaction is equal to
Nn,l−1 · S(τn,l). Relation (19) allows us to make the following sequence of statements:
Nn,l−1 · S(τn,l) = αn,l−1Nl−1 · S(τn,l) = αn,l−1
d∑
i=1
N il−1S
i(τn,l)
≥ αn,l−1
d∑
i=1
N il−1S
i(τ ′l )e
−δ = αn,l−1e
−δNl−1 · S(τl).
Since Π is self-financing
αl−1e
−δNl−1 · S(τl) = αl−1e
−δNl · S(τl).
Consequently, by (19)
αl−1e
−δNl · S(τl) = αl−1e
−δ
d∑
i=1
N il S
i(τl) ≥ αl−1e
−δ
d∑
i=1
N il S
i(τ ′l )e
−δ = αl−1e
−2δNl · S(τ
′
l ).
Therefore, we have obtained the lower bound for αl in the recurrent form: αl ≥ αl−1e
−2δ. Hence,
αm ≥ e
−2mδ.
Consequently, we obtain the estimate
E
y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)Nn,m · S(T )
)2
= E y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)αmNm · S(T )
)2
≥ E y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)e
−2mδNm · S(T )
)2
= e−4mδE y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
.
We come to the final step of the proof. We easily obtain the following estimate
E
y
(
Nm · S(T )
)2
= E y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
+ E y
(
1Acn(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
≤ e4mδE y
(
1An(δ,ǫ)Nn,m · S(T )
)2
+ E y
(
1Acn(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
≤ e4mδE y
(
Nn,m · S(T )
)2
+ E y
(
1Acn(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
≤ e4mδ lim
k→∞
sup
Π′∈A˜m
k
(y)
E
y
(
NΠ
′
(T ) · S(T )
)2
+ E y
(
1Acn(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
. (20)
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Observe that (20) depends on n only by means of An(δ, ǫ). Let δ = ǫ converge to zero. Then
e4mδ lim
k→∞
sup
Π′∈A˜m
k
(y)
E
y
(
NΠ
′
(T ) · S(T )
)2
→ lim
k→∞
sup
Π′∈A˜m
k
(y)
E
y
(
NΠ
′
(T ) · S(T )
)2
and
E
y
(
1Acn(δ,ǫ)Nm · S(T )
)2
→ 0
by the bounded convergence theorem, since Lemma 6.6 assures thatNm ·S(T ) is square integrable.
Define
W (m, y) = sup
Π∈A˜m(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
, m ∈ N, y ∈ E.
For a strategy Π ∈ A˜m(y), y = (η0, s0,x0), by Lemma 6.11 and 6.7
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ lim
n→∞
sup
Π′∈A˜mn (y)
E
y
(
NΠ
′
(T ) · S(T )
)2
≤ (η0 · s0)
2 e2βT .
Hence, the sequence
(
W (m, y)
)
m∈N
is bounded by (η0 · s0)
2 e2βT for y = (η0, s0,x0). Moreover, it
is non-decreasing ofm and converges to
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
(
NΠ(T ) · S(T )
)2
.
6b. Diffusion with bounded coefficients depending on Markovian risk factors
We model the price process as a Doleans-Dade exponential of a diffusion with coefficients depending
on an external process representing risk factors:
dSi(t)
Si(t)
= µi
(
X(t)
)
dt+ σi
(
X(t)
)
· dW (t), i = 1, . . . , d, (21)
where W (t) is a p-dimensional Brownian motion, µi : Rm → R is a drift, σi : Rm → Rp is a
volatility vector and X(t) is a Feller process. We assume that µi and σi are bounded functions. The
solution to (21) can be written explicitly
Si(t) = Si(s) exp
(∫ t
s
σi
(
X(u)
)
· dW (u)−
1
2
∫ t
s
‖σi
(
X(u)
)
‖2du+
∫ t
s
µi
(
X(u)
)
du
)
,
i = 1, . . . , d.
The process S(t) satisfies condition MLT of the previous example with
β = sup
i=1,...,d
(1
2
sup
x∈Rm
‖σi(x)‖2 + sup
x∈Rm
µi(x)
)
. (22)
However, thanks to the special form of S(t) we will be able to obtain stronger results than in the
previous example, especially we will cover the case of unbounded reward function of consumption G
and we will lower the bound for the discount factor α.
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LEMMA 6.12. For y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y), t ≥ 0,
E
y
{
NΠ(t) · S(t)
}
≤ η · s eβ˜t, (23)
where
β˜ = sup
(x,i)∈Rm×{1,...,d}
µi(x).
Proof. Fix y, Π and t. For simplicity of the notation we will skip the superscript Π inNΠ and τΠk . We
shall show that for any i ∈ N
E
y
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
≤ η · s eβt.
The self-financing condition implies
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t) ≤ N(τi−1 ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t).
Moreover, from the strong Markov property of Feller processes it results that
E
y
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
≤ E y
{
E
Π
{
N(τi−1 ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
∣∣Fτi−1∧t}}
We expand the scalar product under the conditional expectation
E
y
{
N(τi−1 ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
∣∣Fτi−1∧t}
=
d∑
k=1
E
y
{
Nk(τi−1 ∧ t)S
k(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
∣∣Fτi−1∧t}
We estimate each term separately
E
y
{
Nk(τi−1 ∧ t)S
k(τi ∧ t)e
β(t−τi∧t)
∣∣Fτi−1∧t}
= Nk(τi−1 ∧ t) E
y
{
eβ˜(t−τi∧t)Sk(τi−1 ∧ t)
exp
(∫ τi∧t
τi−1∧t
σk
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ τi∧t
τi−1∧t
∥∥σk(X(u))∥∥2du
+
∫ τi∧t
τi−1∧t
µk
(
X(u)
)
du
)∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧t
}
≤ Nk(τi−1 ∧ t)S
k(τi−1 ∧ t)
E
Π
{
eβ˜(t−τi∧t)eβ˜(τi∧t−τi−1∧t) exp
(∫ τi∧t
τi−1∧t
σi
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)
−
1
2
∫ τi∧t
τi−1∧t
∥∥σi(X(u))∥∥2du)∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧t
}
= Nk(τi−1 ∧ t)S
k(τi−1 ∧ t)e
β˜(τi−1∧t),
since
s 7→ exp
(∫ s
0
σi
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ s
0
∥∥σi(X(u))∥∥2du)
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is a martingale. To sum it up, we have just shown that
E
y
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
≤ E yN(τi−1 ∧ t) · S(τi−1 ∧ t)e
β˜(τi−1∧t).
Repeating the above reasoning i− 1 times we obtain
E
y
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
≤ η · s eβ˜t.
To finish the proof we let i go to infinity. By the Fatou’s lemma
E
y lim inf
i→∞
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
≤ η · s eβ˜t.
The strategy Π is admissible, so τi(ω) > σ(ω) for infinitely many i. Hence
lim inf
k→∞
{
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t)e
β˜(t−τi∧t)
}
= N(t) · S(t),
which completes the proof.
Observe that by Lemma 6.12 NFL is clearly satisfied. We can prove NFL2 in a particular situation.
COROLLARY 6.13. If F (η, s,x) = (η · s)γ for γ ∈ (0, 1), G ≡ 0 and α > β˜, the condition NFL2
is satisfied.
Proof. Fix a compact set B ⊆ E and κ = 1γ . Take y = (η, s,x) ∈ B and Π ∈ A(y). By Lemma 6.12
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)γκ
dt = E y
∫ ∞
0
e−αtNΠ(t) · S(t)dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−αtE y
{
NΠ(t) · S(t)
}
dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−αtη · s eβ˜tdt =
η · s
α− β˜
.
Hence NFL2 is satisfied as η · s is bounded on compacts.
To obtain results for a wider family of reward functions F andG ≥ 0, we need a more sophisticated
version of Lemma 6.12. Observe that in Lemma 6.14 we derive the estimate for a random time σ
whereas in the previous subsection we could only prove a similar result for deterministic times (see
Corollary 6.2). This result is crucial for the extension of the class of tractable functionsG. Notice that
βˆ defined below is different from β in (22).
LEMMA 6.14. For y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y), γ ≥ 0 and a bounded stopping time σ
E
y
{
e−γσNΠ(σ) · S(σ)
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e−8(βˆ−γ)σ
})1/4
, (24)
where
βˆ = sup
i=1,...,d
(
sup
x∈Rm
‖σi(x)‖2 + sup
x∈Rm
µi(x)
)
.
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Proof. Similarly as before we shall skip the superscript Π in NΠ and τΠi . Fix y = (η, s,x) ∈ E and
Π ∈ A(y). First we will show that for arbitrary i ∈ N and a bounded non-negative random variable ξ
E
y
{(
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4}
(25)
≤ EΠ
{(
e−γ(τi−1∧σ)N(τi−1 ∧ σ) · S(τi−1 ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
ξe8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)
∣∣Fτi−1∧σ})1/4}.
The self-financing condition implies
N(τi ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t) ≤ N(τi−1 ∧ t) · S(τi ∧ t).
Consequently,
E
y
{(
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4}
≤ E y
{
E
y
{(
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi−1 ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ}
}
.
We expand the scalar product under the conditional expectation
E
y
{(
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi−1 ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/2∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ}
=
d∑
k,l=1
Nk(τi−1 ∧ σ)N
l(τi−1 ∧ σ)
E
y
{
e−2γ(τi∧σ)Sk(τi ∧ σ)S
l(τi ∧ σ)
(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ}
and estimate each term separately
Nk(τi−1 ∧ σ)N
l(τi−1 ∧ σ)E
y
{
e−2γ(τi∧σ)Sk(τi ∧ σ)S
l(τi ∧ σ)
(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ}
= e−2γ(τi−1∧σ)Nk(τi−1 ∧ σ)N
l(τi−1 ∧ σ)S
k(τi−1 ∧ σ)S
l(τi−1 ∧ σ)
E
y
{
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
σk
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σk(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
µk
(
X(u)
)
du
)
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
σl
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σl(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
µl
(
X(u)
)
du
)
e−2γ(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)
(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ
}
.
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By Schwartz inequality and the martingale property of Doleans-Dade exponential
E
y
{
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
σk
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σk(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
µk
(
X(u)
)
du
)
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
σl
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
1
2
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σl(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
µl
(
X(u)
)
du
)
e−2γ(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)
(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/4∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ
}
≤
(
E
y
{
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
2σl
(
X(u)
)
dW (u)−
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σl(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
2µl
(
X(u)
)
du
)
exp
(∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σk(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
2µk
(
X(u)
)
du− 4γ(τi ∧ σ − τi−1 ∧ σ)
)
(
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
})1/2∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ
})1/2
≤
(
E
y
{
exp
(
6
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σl(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
4µl
(
X(u)
)
du
)
exp
(
2
∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
∥∥σk(X(u))∥∥2du+ ∫ τi∧σ
τi−1∧σ
4µk
(
X(u)
)
du− 8γ(τi ∧ σ − τi−1 ∧ σ)
)
E
y
{
ξ|Fτi∧σ
}∣∣∣∣Fτi−1∧σ
})1/4
≤
(
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)ξ
∣∣Fτi−1∧σ})1/4.
Therefore, we easily obtain (25).
Now, we prove that for any i ∈ N
E
y
{
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e−8(βˆ−γ)σ
})1/4
. (26)
Using (25) with ξ = 0
E
y
{
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
}2
≤ E y
{(
e−γ(τi−1∧σ)N(τi−1 ∧ σ) · S(τi−1 ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)
∣∣Fτi−1∧σ})1/4}.
Next, we apply (25) with ξ = exp
(
8(βˆ − γ)(τi ∧ σ − τi−1 ∧ σ)
)
E
y
{(
e−α(τi−1∧σ)N(τi−1 ∧ σ) · S(τi−1 ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ−τi−1∧σ)
∣∣Fτi−1∧σ})1/4}
≤ E y
{(
e−α(τi−2∧σ)N(τi−2 ∧ σ) · S(τi−2 ∧ σ)
)2(
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ−τi−2∧σ)
∣∣Fτi−2∧σ})1/4}.
We repeat the last step i− 2 times and obtain (26). We send i to infinity. The monotone convergence
theorem and the admissibility of Π yield
lim
i→∞
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)(τi∧σ)
}
= E y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)σ
}
.
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Since Π is admissible, τi(ω) > σ(ω) apart from finitely many i. So by Fatou’s lemma
lim inf
i→∞
E
y
{
e−γ(τi∧σ)N(τi ∧ σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
}2
≥ E y
{
e−γσN(σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
}2
.
Therefore,
E
y
{
e−γσN(σ) · S(τi ∧ σ)
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e8(βˆ−γ)σ
})1/4
.
COROLLARY 6.15. If γ ≥ βˆ then the assumption on boundedness of the stopping time σ in Lemma
6.14 can be skipped, i.e. for y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y) and any stopping time σ
E
y
{
e−γσNΠ(σ) · S(σ)
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e−8(γ−βˆ)σ
})1/4
, (27)
Proof. By Lemma 6.14 for any T > 0
E
y
{
e−γ(σ∧T )NΠ(σ ∧ T ) · S(σ ∧ T )
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e8(σ∧T )(βˆ−γ)
})1/4
.
Since (βˆ − γ) ≤ 0, monotone convergence theorem yields
lim
T→∞
(
E
y
{
e8(σ∧T )(βˆ−γ)
})1/4
=
(
E
y
{
e8σ(βˆ−γ)
})1/4
and the limit is finite. Fatou’s lemma implies
E
y lim inf
T→∞
{
e−γ(σ∧T )NΠ(σ ∧ T ) · S(σ ∧ T )
}2
≤ lim inf
T→∞
E
y
{
e−γ(σ∧T )NΠ(σ ∧ T ) · S(σ ∧ T )
}2
≤ (η · s)2
(
E
y
{
e8σ(βˆ−γ)
})1/4
.
Obviously
lim inf
T→∞
(
e−γ(σ∧T )NΠ(σ ∧ T ) · S(σ ∧ T )
)
= e−γσNΠ(σ) · S(σ),
which completes the proof.
COROLLARY 6.16. If βˆ < 2α, κ ∈ [1, 2α
βˆ
∧ 2] then for y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y) and any
stopping time σ
E
y
{
e−ασ
(
NΠ(σ) · S(σ)
)κ}
≤ (η · s)κ
(
E
y
{
e−8(
2α
κ
−βˆ)σ
})κ/8
, (28)
and consequently
E
y
{
e−ασ
(
NΠ(σ) · S(σ)
)κ}
≤ (η · s)κ.
Proof. It is an easy application of Ho¨lder inequality and Corollary 6.15.
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COROLLARY 6.17. If βˆ < 2α, κ ∈ [1, 2α
βˆ
∧ 2] then for y ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y) and l < k
E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
k
(
NΠ(τΠk ) · S(τ
Π
k )
)κ∣∣FτΠ
l
}
≤ e−ατ
Π
l
(
NΠ(τΠl ) · S(τ
Π
l )
)κ
.
Proof. It follows from the proof of Lemma 6.14 and the arguments used in the above corollaries.
We shall prove the existence of an optimal strategy for reward functions F satisfying assumption
AF, i.e.
∃A,B ≥ 0 0 ≤ F (η, s,x) ≤ A+B(η · s), (η, s,x) ∈ E,
and reward functions G satisfying
Assumption AG. There exists A,B ≥ 0 such that
G(s) ≤ A+Bs, s ∈ R+.
Observe that without loss of generality the constants in AF and AG can be the same. Notice that
condition AG is satisfied by all non-negative HARA utility functions.
We will not use Theorem 5.1. We have to exploit directly the properties of the price process to
obtain the result in this generality.
THEOREM 6.18. Assume that F satisfies AF, G satisfies AG, α > βˆ/2,
βˆ = sup
i=1,...,d
(
sup
x∈Rm
‖σi(x)‖2 + sup
x∈Rm
µi(x)
)
,
and NUM holds. Then the value function is continuous and satisfies the Bellman equation v = Gv.
Moreover, there exists an optimal strategy for any y ∈ E.
For the proof of the theorem we shall need the following lemmas:
LEMMA 6.19. Under the assumptions of Theorem 6.18
v(η, s,x) ≤ A1 +B1(η · s), (η, s,x) ∈ E,
where A1 =
A
α , B1 =
B
2α−βˆ
+B and v is the value function.
Proof. Fix y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y). Recall that
J(Π) = E y
{∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
dt+
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G
(
CΠk
)}
. (29)
By Corollary 6.16
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
dt ≤ A
∫ ∞
0
e−αtdt+B
∫ ∞
0
e−αtE y
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)
dt
≤
A
α
+B(η · s)
∫ ∞
0
e−(2α−βˆ)tdt =
A
α
+
B
2α− βˆ
(η · s).
We shall prove that the second term of (29) satisfies the following inequality:
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk ) ≤ B(η · s).
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Obviously, by AG1
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk ) ≤ BE
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk .
By Corollary 6.17 we have
E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
k Nk−1 · S(τ
Π
k )
∣∣FτΠ
k−1
}
≤ e−ατ
Π
k−1Nk−1 · S(τ
Π
k−1).
Hence, for anyM ≥ 1
E
y
M∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk ≤ E
y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk + E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
M
(
CΠM +N
Π
M · S(τ
Π
M )
)∣∣FτΠ
M−1
}}
≤ E y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk + e
−ατΠ
M−1NΠM−1 · S(τ
Π
M−1)
}
≤ . . . ≤ η · s.
By monotone convergence theorem
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk ≤ η · s.
Proof of Theorem 6.18. Recall that the key point in the proof of Theorem 5.1 was to show that
functions vi and v are continuous. Since we cannot prove assumption NFL2 for unbounded G we
shall use a different technique. Recall that
v0(y) = E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αsF
(
Y (s)
)
ds
and vi(y) = Gvi−1(y), i = 1, 2, . . ., y ∈ E, where G is the Bellman operator.
For a continuous function h : E → R+ satisfying h(η, s,x) ≤ A2 +B2(η · s) we define
Hh(y) = sup
τ
E
y
{∫ τ
0
e−αtF
(
Y (t)
)
dt+ e−ατh
(
Y (τ)
)}
and
HhH(y) = sup
τ
E
y
{∫ τ
0
e−αt
(
F
(
Y (t)
)
∧H
)
dt+ e−ατ
(
h
(
Y (τ)
)
∧H
)}
, H > 0.
By the Feller property of
(
S(t),X(t)
)
the value function HhH of the above stopping problem is con-
tinuous (see [10]). Observe that
Hh(y)−HhH(y) ≤ sup
τ
E
y
∫ τ
0
e−αs
(
F
(
Y (s)
)
−H
)
1F (Y (s))≥Hds
+ sup
τ
E
ye−ατ
(
h
(
Y (τ)
)
−H
)
1h(Y (τ))≥H = (I) + (II).
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Fix H ≥ max(A,A2), κ ∈ (1,
2α
βˆ
∧ 2), y = (η, s,x) ∈ E and observe that
(I) ≤
1
Hκ−1
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
((
F
(
Y (t)
)
−A
)+)κ
dt ≤
Bκ
Hκ−1
∫ ∞
0
E
ye−αt
(
η · S(t)
)κ
dt.
Consequently, by Corollary 6.16
(I) ≤
Bκ
Hκ−1
∫ ∞
0
e−(2α−κβˆ)t(η · s)κ =
Bκ(η · s)κ
Hκ−1(2α− κβˆ)
.
Analogously, by Corollary 6.16
(II) ≤
Bκ2 (η · s)
κ
Hκ−1
.
Hence,HhH converges toH
h uniformly on compact sets andHh is a continuous function.
Continuity of vi is proved by induction. Notice that v0 = H
0. Fix k > 0 and assume that vk is
continuous. Observe that vk+1 = H
h, where h = Mvk. By Lemma 3.2 h is a continuous function.
Since vk ≤ v, using Lemma 6.19 and assumption AG we have h(η, s,x) ≤ A+A1+(B+B1)(η ·s).
Therefore, by the above argument vk+1 is a continuous function. Moreover, by the standard impulsive
control argument vk is a value function for the problem with the number of impulses bounded by k.
We still have to show that v is continuous, i.e. vk converges to v uniformly on compact sets. Fix a
compact set D ⊆ E. It suffices to prove that
E
y
{∫ ∞
τΠi
e−αtF
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)
dt+
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk )
}
→ 0, i→∞, (30)
uniformly for y ∈ D and Π ∈ A(y), since
0 ≤ v(y)− vk(y) ≤ E
y
{∫ ∞
τΠi
e−αtF
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)
dt+
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk )
}
.
Uniform convergence of the first term in (30) results from the arguments presented in subsection
6a. However, we shall present a sketch for completeness. Fix κ ∈ (1, 2α
βˆ
), y = (η, s,x) ∈ D and
Π ∈ A(y). By assumption AF and Ho¨lder inequality
E
y
{∫ ∞
τΠi
e−αtF
(
Y Π(t)
)
dt
}
≤ E y
{∫ ∞
τΠi
e−αtA+
∫ ∞
τΠi
e−αtB
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)
dt
}
≤
A
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i +B
{
E
y
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(
NΠ(t) · S(t)
)κ
dt
} 1
κ
( 1
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i
)κ−1
κ
By Corollary 6.16 we obtain the following estimate
A
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i +
B(η · s)
(2α− βˆκ)1/κ
( 1
α
E
ye−ατ
Π
i
)κ−1
κ
,
which by Lemma 4.1 converges to zero uniformly for Π ∈ A(y), y ∈ D.
Now we shall concentrate on the second term of (30)
E
y
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk ).
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Obviously, by AG
E
y
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k G(CΠk ) ≤ AE
y
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k +BE y
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk .
First term is uniformly convergent by Lemma 4.3.
Fix y = (η, s,x) ∈ E, Π ∈ A(y). By Corollary 6.17 we have
E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
k NΠk−1 · S(τ
Π
k )
∣∣FτΠ
k
}
≤ e−ατ
Π
k−1NΠk−1 · S(τ
Π
k−1).
Hence, for anyM > i
E
y
M∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk ≤ E
y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk + E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
M
(
CΠM +N
Π
M · S(τ
Π
M )
)∣∣FτΠ
M−1
}}
≤ E y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk + e
−ατΠ
M−1NΠM−1 · S(τ
Π
M−1)
}
≤ e−ατ
Π
i NΠi · S(τ
Π
i ).
By monotone convergence theorem
E
y
∞∑
k=i
e−ατ
Π
k CΠk ≤ e
−ατΠi NΠi · S(τ
Π
i ),
which, by Corollary 6.16, is bounded by
η · s
(
E
y
{
e8τ
Π
i (βˆ−2α)
})1/4
.
Lemma 4.1 implies that E y
{
e8τ
Π
i (βˆ−2α)
}
tends to zero uniformly for y ∈ D and Π ∈ A(y).
The fact that v solves the Bellman equation v = Gv follows by standard arguments. The optimality
of the strategy constructed in Corollary 4.5 results from (30).
The extension of the class of tractable reward functions resulted in a weaker bound for α, the
discount factor. In Corollary 6.13 we imposed only
α > β˜ = sup
(x,i)∈Rm×{1,...,d}
µi(x).
In Theorem 6.18, by contrast, we required
α > βˆ/2 = sup
i=1,...,d
(1
2
sup
x∈Rm
‖σi(x)‖2 +
1
2
sup
x∈Rm
µi(x)
)
,
which is still better than in Subsection 6a. Moreover, in comparison to results obtained in the previous
subsection the specific form of the price process allowed to cover unbounded functions G.
For completeness of the reasoning we shall drive condition NFL2 for unbounded G.
LEMMA 6.20. Under AF and AG, for α > βˆ condition NFL2 is satisfied with κ = 2.
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Proof. The part of the condition NFL2 concerning F can be proved in the same way as in subsection
6a, but with the use of Corollary 6.16 instead of Corollary 6.2. Here we only have to derive for a
compact set D ⊆ E
sup
y∈D
sup
Π∈A(y)
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)2
≤ ∞.
Fix y = (η, s,x) ∈ E and Π ∈ A(y). We shall prove that
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)2
≤
A2
−α
+ 2AB(η · s) +B2(η · s)2.
By AG
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
G(CΠk )
)2
= E y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
A2 + 2ABCΠk +B
2(CΠk )
2
)
.
By the proof Lemma 6.19 we have the estimate of the first two terms:
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
A2 + 2ABCΠk
)
≤
A2
−α
+ 2AB(η · s).
We only need to prove that
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k B2(CΠk )
2 ≤ B2(η · s)2.
By Corollary 6.17 we have
E
y
{
e−ατ
Π
k
(
Nk−1 · S(τ
Π
k )
)2∣∣FτΠ
k−1
}
≤ e−ατ
Π
k−1
(
Nk−1 · S(τ
Π
k−1)
)2
.
Hence, for anyM ≥ 1
E
y
M∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
CΠk
)2
≤ E y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
CΠk
)2
+ E y
{
e−ατ
Π
M
((
CΠM
)2
+
(
NΠM · S(τ
Π
M )
)2)∣∣FτΠ
M−1
}}
≤ E y
{M−1∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
CΠk
)2
+ e−ατ
Π
M−1
(
NΠM−1 · S(τ
Π
M−1)
)2}
≤ . . . ≤ (η · s)2.
By monotone convergence theorem
E
y
∞∑
k=1
e−ατ
Π
k
(
CΠk
)2
≤ (η · s)2.
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6c. Applications
A considerable number of examples was cited in the introduction. Here we shall present other impor-
tant examples in detail.
Paper [12] encouraged us to construct a functional that measures diversification of the portfolio.
Let w∗ ∈ S , S = {w ∈ [0, 1]d : w1 + · · · + wd = 1}, be the target proportion (understood as
a perfect diversification strategy). Consider the functional
E
(s,x)
∫ ∞
0
e−αtF
(
NΠ(t),S(t),X(t)
)
dt, (31)
where
F (η, s,x) = η · s
d∑
i=1
αi(1− |wi − w∗i|),
or, in general,
F (η, s,x) = (η · s) f(w,w∗,x),
where wi = η
isi
η·s , α
i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , d and f is any continuous bounded function. Observe that
assumptions UF and AF are satisfied, so theorems from Sections 6a and 6b easily apply.
In the model of Section 6b we consider a problem of variance-conscious portfolio management.
The reward functional has the form (31) with
F (η, s,x) = (η · s) f
(
‖
d∑
i=1
wiσi(x)‖2
)
or, more general, with f depending on the economic factors
F (η, s,x) = (η · s) f
(
‖
d∑
i=1
wiσi(x)‖2,x
)
,
where w is the proportion as above, σ(x) is a volatility matrix of the price process (see (21)), ‖ · ‖2 is
an Euclidean norm in Rp and f is a bounded continuous function, e.g.
f(p) = (∆− p)γ + δ, p ∈ R,
where γ > 0, δ ≥ 0 and
∆ = sup
x∈Rm
sup
i=1,...,m
|σi(x)|.
Here, same as above, assumptions UF and AF are satisfied.
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